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NOTES
Child Custody for Disabled Adults:
What Kentucky Families Need
BY AMY P. HAUSER*
INTRODUCTION
6;6;erhaps the most heart wrenching aspect of the breakup of a
17-marriage is the effect of the divorce on the children.... [But]
[c]ustody issues do not end with the divorce."' As the number of marriages
ending in divorce increases, issues of child support and child custody
multiply in importance.? Families with disabled children are more
frequently included in these divorces than families without disabled
children.' Divorce court dockets contain many support and custody cases
involving families with handicapped children partly because these families
experience "unique burdens" due to the difficulties related to caring for
handicapped children,4 and each case is distinct.'
* J.D. expected 2004, University of Kentucky. The author, foremost, gives
thanks to the Lord for all His many blessings. The author would also like to thank
Professor Louise Graham, Elizabeth Key, and W. Patrick Hauser for their advice
and insight on this topic. She further gives credit and appreciation to her husband,
Gus, and to her family for their constant encouragement and support.
'Legal Information on Child Custody, Child Support, Prenutual Agreement,
Shared Custody, at http://www.thelawyerpages.com/legalqna/Child%20Custody
(last visited Feb. 17, 2003).
2 The National Center for Health Statistics set the divorce rate at 43% based on
a study done in 1995, but the U.S. Census Bureau increased the rate to about 50%
in 2002. Americans for Divorce Reform, Divorce Rates-Divorce Statistics
Collection, at http://www.divorcereform.org/rates.html (lastvisited Feb. 17,2003).
3 Michelle Turner, Unhappy Families: Special Considerations in Custody
Cases Involving Handicapped Children, 24 J. FAM. L. 59, 59 (1985) (citing
HEATHER FEATHERSTONE, A DIFFERENCE IN THE FAMILY 248 (1980)).
4 Id. at 59.
5Id.
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Across the country, the primary consideration for custody is the best
interests of the child.6 In Kentucky, the courts have addressed the treatment
of child support, custody, and visitation for minor children who are
mentally and physically handicapped.7 However, the Kentucky legislature
and courts have failed to give equal attention to these issues with respect
to mentally handicapped children who have reached the age of majority.8
A primary issue remaining untouched by Kentucky statutes and courts is
the question of which court has jurisdiction over the issue of custody of'
handicapped adult children. For instance, a parent may want to request a
change of custody of an adult disabled or handicapped child to alter
custody decisions that were made when the child was a minor. The result
of this attempt by the parent is uncertain because the parent cannot, under
present law, be sure of where to bring such an action. The role of a
guardian, who is usually appointed for a handicapped adult, may need to be
considered in deciding the jurisdiction of the courts. The jurisdictional
issue may be further complicated by the recent addition of family courts in
Kentucky.9 Kentucky'sjurisdictional uncertainty, with respect to this issue,
must be removed to insure that adult handicapped children's best interests
are served. To this end, a statute that specifically addresses custody of a
handicapped adult child would benefit Kentucky and its families.
Part I of this Note discusses the widely accepted duty of a parent of a
mentally handicapped child to continue paying child support beyond the
age of majority. The extension of this duty to adults who do not become
disabled until after reaching the age of majority is also briefly examined."
Part II explores custody decisions regarding mentally disabled adult
children and examines statutes enacted by other states directed at this issue.
The present statutes of Kentucky are also evaluated." In Part III, the role
6 d. at 60.
7 See, e.g., Brighty v. Brighty, 883 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1994).
Issues surrounding the provision of support for a handicapped adult child have
been addressed elsewhere. See M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, Parent's Obligation
to Support Adult Child, I A.L.R.2d 910 (1948). But see Breuer v. Dowden, 268
S.W. 541 (Ky. 1925) (deciding whether a parent is liable for care of adult child
who is sick and living at home); Crain v. Mallone, 113 S.W. 67 (Ky. 1908)
(denying a charge against a helpless adult child for the value of his support by
parent in distribution of estate).
9 Other states have looked at this situation, though narrowly, and have provided
some insight to developing a solution. States including Tennessee and Ohio have
noted this situation. The number of cases on this specific issue is limited but will
be explored in this Note. See infra notes 18-30, 33 and accompanying text.
'0 See infra notes 14-64 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 65-126 and accompanying text.
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of guardianship law and the impact of the advent of family courts through-
out Kentucky are considered.' 2 Part IV concludes that Kentucky should
enact legislation that addresses the jurisdiction of courts to change custody
for disabled adults by taking into account their best interests. 3
I. DUTY TO PROVIDE CHILD SUPPORT FOR
MENTALLY HANDICAPPED ADULTS
Generally, the duty of parents to support their children only endures
until the child reaches the age of eighteen. 4 Courts as early as 1908,
however, have recognized the extension of this duty when the child is
"helpless" or "incapable."'" The Kentucky Supreme Court in Crain v.
Mallone"6 remarked:
The duty and obligation of a parent to care for his offspring does not
necessarily terminate when the child arrives at age or becomes an adult;
nor is it limited to infants and children of tender years. An adult child may
from accident or disease be as helpless and incapable of making his
support as an infant, and we see no difference in principle between the
duty imposed upon the parent to support the infant and the obligation to
care for the adult, who is equally, if not more, dependant upon the
parent.'
7
Historically, most states did not have a common law duty to continue
supporting disabled children upon majority.' However, many states did
acknowledge a moral duty that in turn created a legal duty for a parent to
continue to support children post-minority if they were unable to support
12 See infra notes 127-55 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 156-75 and accompanying text.
'4See, e.g., Mower v. Mower, 199 N.W. 42,42-43 (S.D. 1924) (quoting Schultz
v. W. Farm Tractor Co., 190 P. 1007, 1008 (Wash. 1920)). Cf. Speckv. Speck, 168
S.E.2d 672, 677 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969) (quoting Wells v. Wells, 44 S.E.2d 31, 35
(N.C. 1947) (holding that parental duty of support terminates when the child
reaches majority, which is defined by the court to be twenty-one years old)).
'" Crain v. Mallone, 113 S.W. 67, 68 (Ky. 1908).
'61d.
17 Id.
' See, e.g., Borchert v. Borchert, 45 A.2d 463,465 (Md. 1946), superseded by
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 13-102(b) (2002).
2002-2003]
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themselves due to a physical or mental disability.' 9 This duty found its roots
in statutory provisions that mandated providing for the poor ° or assigned
criminal penalties for not supporting minor children." Blackstone's
Commentaries expresses that "necessaries" must be supplied for those who
are incompetent and not capable of working.22 Blackstone further character-
izes this duty as a "principle of natural law."23
Some jurisdictions did recognize a common law duty to care for
disabled children post-minority.24 The rationale for this common law duty
was that "'the wants and weaknesses of children render it necessary that
some person maintains them, and the voice of nature has pointed out the
parent as the most fit and proper person. The laws and customs of all
nations have enforced this plain precept of universal law.' ,25 It soon
became a trend for courts deciding these cases to declare such a duty.26 The
"tendency" to decide in this manner persisted even though many states did
not have a statute to support enforcement of this duty.27 For instance, the
1 Id.; Dransfield, supra note 8, § 2 (indicating that the moral obligation existed
in England and a minority of American jurisdictions); see also Noralyn D. Harlow,
Annotation, Postmajority Disability as Revising Parental Duty to Support Child,
48 A.L.R. 4th 919, § 2a (1986).
20 Dransfield, supra note 8, § 1, § 5; see also Harlow, supra note 19, § 2a.
21 Borchert, 45 A.2d at 465.
22 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *449,
quotedin Borchert, 45 A.2d at 465. See also Breuer v. Dowden, 268 S.W. 541,542
(Ky. 1925).
23 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at 419, quoted in Castle v. Castle, 473 N.E.2d
803 (1984).
24 See, e.g., Castle, 473 N.E.2d at 804, 806.
25 Id. at 806 (quoting 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 190
(13th ed. 1884)).26 See Borchert, 45 A.2d at 465. See also Sayne v. Sayne, 284 S.W.2d 309,311-
12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955).27 Borchert, 45 A.2d at 465. Typically, the courts that found no duty to continue
support past the age of eighteen despite the child's disability based this decision on
the view that a statute was necessary, but lacking. See Kramer v. Carroll, 309
S.W.2d 654, 659-60 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958); Dransfield, supra note 8, § 5 (stating
that some cases require liability for support as predicated on statute). Some states
designate requirements that a parent must meet pursuant to this duty of support. For
example, Maryland requires a parent of an incapacitated child to support that child
if the parent has sufficient resources to provide such support. See MD. CODE ANN.,
FAM. LAW § 13-102(b) (2002). This statute is entitled "Acts barred; punishment."
Subsection (b) describes a qualified duty to support a destitute child. See also
Freeburger v. Bichell, 763 A.2d 1226, 1228, 1232 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).
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New Jersey Supreme Court held in Kruvant v. Kruvant21 that parents have
a duty to support adult disabled children based on common sense and also
because humanity calls for such action.29 The court in Kruvant further
determined that the duty to support does not end until the adult child's need
ends.30 Many courts today still follow this practice of creating a duty for
parents to continue support of adult mentally and physically disabled
children.3 In addition, most states now have some form of statute imposing
civil liability on parents who fail to support an adult handicapped child.32
Kentucky statutes provide child support guidance with respect to minor
children, including children with disabilities. Kentucky Revised Statute
("K.R.S.") § 405.020 governs child support for children under the age of
eighteen.33 According to the statute, when a child becomes eighteen years
old he is considered emancipated, 34 and at that time the support obligation
terminates.35 Child support for an adult handicapped child is governed by
K.R.S. § 405.020(2), which states: "The father and mother shall have joint
custody, care, and support of their children who have reached the age of
eighteen (18) and who are wholly dependent because of permanent physical
or mental disability."36 This statute holds both parents responsible for a
child who is "wholly dependent" when he becomes eighteen.37 Notably, this
child is not regarded as emancipated.38
Jurisdiction over child support disputes is also controlled by statute. In
Kentucky, such jurisdiction is specified in K.R.S. § 205.766, which
explains that concurrent jurisdiction rests with the district and circuit courts
"to establish, modify, and enforce obligations of child support" in situations
where paternity is not a concern.39 The court that issues the support order
28 Kruvant v. Kruvant, 241 A.2d 259 (N.J. 1968).
29Id. at 265-66.
30Id. See also Cohen v. Cohen, 69 A.2d 752, 754 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1949). This means that the support may continue indefinitely. Id. at 754.31 See, e.g., Breuer v. Dowden, 268 S.W. 541,542 (Ky. 1925); Freeburger, 763
A.2d at 1229. See also Harlow, supra note 19, § 2a.
32 See Dransfield, supra note 8, § 2.
33 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. [hereinafter K.R.S.] § 405.020 (Banks-Baldwin 1998).
34Id. See also Carricato v. Carricato, 384 S.W.2d 85, 87-88 (Ky. 1964).
31 K.R.S. § 403.213(3) (Banks-Baldwin 2000). See also id. § 403.212 (setting
forth child support guidelines and factors used in calculating the amount of
support).
36 Id. § 405.020(2).
37 Id.
38 id.
39Id. § 205.766.
2002-20031
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"has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over [that] child support order."4
However, one must look to Kentucky case law to resolve the jurisdictional
question with respect to child support disputes involving children over the
age of eighteen. For example, in Abbott v. Abbott,4 the appellate court held
that the circuit court that issued the original child support decree retained
jurisdiction over the support provisions for a disabled child over the age of
eighteen.42 The court utilized K.R.S. § 405.020(2) and K.R.S. § 403.250(3)
to reach this conclusion.43 The court reasoned that because wholly
dependent children are not emancipated by law, the circuit court retains
jurisdiction." In cases where a non-handicapped child is involved, the
jurisdiction over child support for adult children is generally different. In
this situation, a contractual agreement between the parents calling for
additional support beyond the age of eighteen is needed. Without such a
contract, the circuit court does not possess jurisdiction to order post-
minority support.45
State courts throughout the nation are split on decisions regarding
responsibility for adult children who become disabled after reaching the
age of majority.46 Cases focus on whether child support can be ordered and
on which court has such authority.47 In Sininger v. Sininger, s the Maryland
Supreme Court held that a statutory obligation to support a handicapped
child exists regardless of the time the incapacity developed. 49 According to
40 Id. § 407.5205.
41 Abbott v. Abbott, 673 S.W.2d 723 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
41 Id. at 726.
4"See K.R.S. § 403.250(3) (Michie 1984) ("Unless otherwise agreed in writing
or expressly provided in the decree, provisions for the support of a child are
terminated by emancipation of the child but not by the death of a parent obligated
to support the child.").
44 See Abbott, 673 S.W.2d at 726.
45 See id. at 725; see also Wilhoit v. Wilhoit, 521 S.W.2d 512, 513 (Ky. 1975)
("While it is true that the court may not require a parent to support a child beyond
majority, there is no reason why a contract executed by a parent, which would
require support to extend beyond that period, may not be enforced."); Showalter
v. Showalter, 497 S.W.2d 420 (Ky. 1973) ("[I]n the absence of a contract, the legal
obligation of a father to support his child terminates upon his reaching his
eighteenth birthday.").
46 Turner, supra note 3, at 66-67; see also Harlow, supra note 19.
47 Interview with Louise Graham, Professor of Law, University of Kentucky
College of Law, in Lexington, Ky. (Oct. 2, 2002).
41 Sininger v. Sininger, 479 A.2d 1354 (Md. 1984).
491Id. at 1358.
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this court, the circuit courts possess general equity jurisdiction to enforce
a parental duty to support a handicapped or disabled child.5" In Freeburger
v. Bichell,5 l the court revisited Sininger and held that Maryland law
requires two factors be satisfied in order for the duty of support to apply.52
According to the Maryland statute,53 the duty of support applies despite the
time the disability arises: "if(l) the adult child has no means of subsistence
and cannot be self-supporting due to physical or mental infirmity; and (2)
the parent has the means or is able to earn sufficient means to provide the
support."54 The opposite decision was made by the Texas Supreme Court
in Red v. Red." The court held that a request for post-majority child support
payments could not be heard unless it had been previously established that
the child required "continuous care and personal supervision because of the
existence of mental or physical disability prior to reaching the 18th
birthday."56 This issue is subject to continuous debate and varies between
the states.
The statutory definitions for "children" or "minor" or "age of majority"
often facilitate the interpretation of related state statutes governing child
support. For instance, the Kentucky statute governing the age of majority,
K.R.S. § 2.015, states that:
Persons of the age of eighteen (18) years are of the age of majority for all
purposes in this Commonwealth except for the purchase of alcoholic
beverages and for purposes of care and treatment of children with
disabilities, for which twenty-one (21) years is the age of majority, all
other statutes to the contrary notwithstanding.
57
Some states specifically define "children" as persons over the age of
eighteen who are mentally or physically disabled. For example, in Colburn
v. Colburn," the definition of "minor child" vested jurisdiction in the
0 Id. at 1361.
5' Freeburger v. Bichell, 763 A.2d 1226 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).52Id. at 1232.
53 MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 13-102 (2002).
54 Freeburger, 736 A.2d at 1232 (emphasis added).
15 Red v. Red, 552 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. 1977), superseded by TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 154.002 (Vernon 2002).
56 Id. at 94. The mother of the child requested child support payments eight
years after the child reached the age of eighteen. Id. at 90-91.
11 K.R.S. § 2.015 (Banks-Baldwin 2002). See also Young v. Young, 413
S.W.2d 887 (Ky. 1967).
58 Colburn v. Colburn, 412 A.2d 1309 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980).
2002-2003]
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circuit court to give orders for visitation rights.59 The father was given
custody and later appointed guardian of his mentally retarded son while the
child was still a minor.' The issue later became whether the circuit court
retained continuing jurisdiction over proceedings regarding the child once
he had attained the age of majority.6 According to Colburn, the equity
court in Maryland "has jurisdiction over the custody, guardianship,
legitimation, maintenance, visitation and support of a child."'62 The court
held that jurisdiction remained with the circuit court since the child was
still considered a "minor child" under the definition in the statute, though
he was technically an adult.63 The court's conclusion was also influenced
by legislative policy that, while not in effect at the time of the case, defined
"minor child" as: "'a child 18 years of age or older who, because of mental
or physical disability is dependent upon a parent.' "" While many states
have vested jurisdiction in a particular court for child support disputes
involving handicapped adult children, specific jurisdictional provisions for
custody modification are not as certain.
II. CHILD CUSTODY FOR MENTALLY HANDICAPPED
ACROSS THE COUNTRY
The "best interest" of the child is the primary concern and the
"universal test" for courts in custody proceedings.65 Kentucky has
supported this view for many years. In 1942, the Kentucky Supreme Court
in Perkins v. Perkins66 determined that "the true guide for the court is the
welfare of the child."67 The special needs of a handicapped child certainly
59Id. at 1313.
I0 d. at 1310.
6Id. at 1311.
62 Id. at 1312 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-602 (1974, 1979
Supp.) (repealed 1984)). The Court examined two statutes in reaching this
conclusion. See also id. at 1313 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE § 66(f) (1957, 1973
Repl. Vol.) (repealed)). Jurisdiction is entrusted to the equity court if the state was
the matrimonial domicile of the couple, the court previously obtained jurisdiction
of the parties, and one of the parties was a resident. Id.
63 Id. at 1313. The court noted a definition of a "minor child" that included" 'a
child 18 years of age or older who, because of mental or physical disability is
dependent upon a parent.' "Id. at 1313 n.3 (citation omitted).
"Id. at 1313 n.3.
6' Turner, supra note 3, at 60.
66 Perkins v. Perkins, 165 S.W.2d 152 (Ky. 1942).
67 Id. at 152. In providing the rationale behind this guideline, the court
explained a child "is not a chattel," but instead is a "human being." Therefore, the
child cannot be treated like a chattel and "disposed of" in a way that satisfies the
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require that close attention be paid to the child's interests.68 Other factors
that courts may consider in custody decisions involving a disabled child
include educational opportunities, how each parent can meet the child's
needs, presence of a stable environment, whether the parent can spend
plenty of time with the child, and the extent of the parent's knowledge
regarding the disability.69 The ongoing consideration of these issues
remains important because the child's needs change as time passes,
particularly as he grows older.
In making custody decisions for disabled or handicapped children, one
court stresses: "[Custody] must be guided by such overriding policies [such
as best interests of the child] rather than by the personal beliefs or attitudes
of the contesting parties, since it is the child's interest which remains
paramount. ' 70 The "overriding policies" referred to include protecting the
needs of children" 'to be raised with love, emotional security and physical
safety,' ,7 ' and providing the right to treatment and rehabilitation services,
public education, social contact, and timely medical care.72 Usually, such
policies are a product of the state legislature.73
The Kentucky statute that resolves custody decisions is K.R.S. §
403.270 .7 This statute employs the "best interests" standard and contem-
plates additional factors including: (a) the parent or guardian's wishes; (b)
the child's wishes; (c) the relations between the child, parent, siblings, and
any other significant person; (d) the ability of child to adjust; (e) the mental
and physical health of each person; (f) domestic violence information
regarding any person involved; (g) the amount of nurture and care given by
the primary caregiver; (h) the parental intent of placing the child with a de
facto custodian; and (i) the situation that resulted in placement with a de
facto custodian.75
parents or someone else. Id.; see also Batchelor v. Fulcher, 415 S.W.2d 828, 830
(Ky. 1967); McCormick v. Lewis, 328 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Ky. 1959).
68 Turner, supra note 3, at 60.
69 Id. at 60-65.
70 Guardianship of Phillip B. v. Warren B., 188 Cal. Rptr. 781, 792 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983).
" Id. at 792 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (repealed 1994)).72 Id. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 4502 (West 1998)).
73 See Castle v. Castle, 473 N.E.2d 803, 807 (Ohio 1984) (Celebrezze, C.J.,
dissenting).
14 K.R.S. § 403.270 (Banks-Baldwin 2002).
75 d. "De facto custodian" is definedby statute inK.R.S. section 403.270(1)(a):
'de facto custodian' means a person who has been shown by clear and
convincing evidence to have been the primary caregiver for, and financial
2002-2003]
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Once a custody decision taking into account all of the aforementioned
factors has been rendered, the question becomes what court has jurisdiction
to decide cases in which a modification of the original decree is sought?
Case law in other states elaborates on the jurisdiction of courts to hear
matters relating to custody modifications involving minor children. The
Ohio Supreme Court in Loetz v. Loetz76 held that the original court that
rendered the divorce and custody decrees retains continuing jurisdiction not
only over custody, but also regarding care and support of the children."
The same court later elaborated on the Loetz holding in In re Poling.7 8 In
re Poling stands for the proposition that although the court issuing the
original custody decision in a divorce case retains jurisdiction to modify
that decision, a juvenile court may have concurrent jurisdiction regarding
custody:79 "the juvenile court may entertain and determine custody of
children properly subject to its jurisdiction, even though there has been a
prior divorce decree granting custody of said children to a parent."80
The Supreme Court of North Carolina agreed with Ohio in holding that
the original court handing down the support and custody decision retains
continuing jurisdiction over further matters8 "[u]nless that court was
somehow divested of its continuing jurisdiction."82 If the court was not
divested of the jurisdiction it had obtained, "it was the only court which
could modify the earlier judgment upon a motion in the cause and a
showing of a change in circumstances."83 The "change in circumstances"
was the necessary component for the court to consider altering the earlier
court decree.84 The new circumstances must also be coupled with an effect
on the interests of the child.85
supporter of, a child who has resided with the person for a period of six (6)
months or more if the child is under three (3) years of age and for a period
of one (1) year or more if the child is three (3) years of age or older or has
been placed by the Department for Community Based Services.
Id.
76 Loetz v. Loetz, 406 N.E.2d 1093 (Ohio 1980).
7 Id. at 1094.
7 In re Poling, 594 N.E.2d 589, 592-93 (Ohio 1992).
79 Id. at 593.
80 Id.
" Stanback v. Stanback, 215 S.E.2d 30, 36 (N.C. 1975).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84Id.
851 d. See also Crosby v. Crosby, 158 S.E.2d 77, 79 (N.C. 1967).
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In Kentucky, modification of a custody decree is governed by K.R.S.
§ 403.340.6 K.R.S. § 403.340(3) requires a change in circumstances for
modification of the custody agreement." In Youngblood v. Youngblood,"
the Kentucky Supreme Court acknowledged the jurisdiction of the circuit
court "to amend, change or to alter any provisions of the judgment
respecting the care, custody, or maintenance of the child as the circum-
stances of the parents and the welfare of the child may require." 9 The
Kentucky Court of Appeals in Burke v. Hammonds" declared the circuit
court's continuing jurisdiction over custody modification under K.R.S. §
403.340.91 These cases and statutes provide guidance for custody modifica-
tion and jurisdiction when minor children are involved. However, the
application to disabled children who have passed the age of majority
remains unsettled by the Kentucky Legislature and courts. Other states may
provide some guidance for Kentucky in considering and acting to meet this
need.
In Scott v. Scott,92 a recent Tennessee case that examines the issue, the
mother desired a modification of the custody arrangement previously
provided by the court.93 The child, Rebecca, was twenty years old and
mentally retarded. Her parents divorced when she was one and a half years
old, and at that time Rebecca was placed in the custody of her
grandparents.94 The Greene County Chancery Court dismissed the mother's
repeated petitions for custody and informed her that she was utilizing the
wrong channels to modify custody for her adult handicapped child. Instead
86 K.R.S. § 403.340 (Banks-Baldwin 2002). This statute requires that a request
for modification not be made within two years of its original decree unless there
is good reason including the endangerment of the child's health (physical, mental,
moral, or emotional) or the original custodian has placed the child with a de facto
custodian. Id. § 403.340(2); see also Youngblood v. Youngblood, 252 S.W.2d 21,
22 (Ky. 1952) (indicating that the wishes of the parents are not the "controlling
factor[s]" to decide custody).
87 K.R.S. § 403.340(3).
88 Youngblood, 252 S.W.2d at 21.
89 Id. at 22-23. See also Burke v. Burke, 103 S.W.2d 291, 292 (Ky. 1937);
Belknap v. Belknap, 96 S.W.2d 1012, 1013 (Ky. 1936); Harmon v. Harmon, 94
S.W.2d 670, 673 (Ky. 1936).
90 Burke v. Hammonds, 586 S.W.2d 307 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
"' Id. at 308.
92 Scott v. Scott, No. 03A01-9708-CH-00305, 1999 WL 39506 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Jan. 29, 1999).
93 Id.
94 Id. at *I1.
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of a custody decree, the mother needed to approach the situation through
a conservator action.95 This action required the court to apply the Tennessee
Code Annotated ("T.C.A.") § 34-1 1-101, which contains the definitions of
"disabled person" and "minor" that influenced the court's decision. 96 The
trial court concluded that Rebecca did need a conservator and that her
grandparents would best fill this position.
The mother, believing that her petition for custody should have been
heard, appealed to the Tennessee Court of Appeals.97 The mother argued
that the Greene County Chancery Court maintained jurisdiction to modify
the custody arrangement under T.C.A. § 36-6-101. 98 Rebecca's mother
argued that the definition of "minors" within this statute included Rebecca
because she was disabled.99 Rebecca's grandparents argued that the
conservatorship action, not the custody modification, was proper.'00
Agreeing with the grandparents, the court of appeals held that the trial court
was correct in dismissing the custody petition and instead using the
conservator procedure; therefore, T.C.A. § 36-6-101 did not apply.'01 The
951 d. Under TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1-101(4) (2002), "conservator" is defined
as "a person or persons appointed by the court to provide partial or full supervision,
protection and assistance of the person or property or both of a disabled person."
96 TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-11-101 (1999) (current version at TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 34-1-101 (2002)). Under subsection (7), "' [d]isabled person' means any person
eighteen (18) years of age or older determined by the court to be in need of partial
or full supervision, protection and assistance by reason of mental illness, physical
illness or injury, developmental disability or other mental or physical incapacity."
Subsection (12) provides that a "'minor' means any person who has not attained
eighteen (18) years of age and who has not otherwise been emancipated." Id.
97 Scott, 1999 WL 39506, at *1.
98 d. at.*2; see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-101 (1999).
99 Scott, 1999 WL 39506, at *2. TENN CODE ANN. § 36-6-101(b) (2000) states
the following:
Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, the party, or
parties, or other person awarded custody and control of such child or
children shall be entitled to enforce the provisions of the court's decree
concerning the suitable support of such child or children in the appropriate
court of any county in this state in which such child or children reside;
provided, that such court shall have divorce jurisdiction, if service of
process is effectuated upon the obligor within this state. Jurisdiction to
modify or alter such decree shall remain in the exclusive control of the court
which issued such decree.
Id.
o Scott, 1999 WL 39506, at *3.
Io' ld. at *3-4.
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court held that Tennessee courts presiding over conservator proceedings
have plenary power'0 2 and that the state has constitutional power to perform
for incompetents. 03 Thus, this court reasoned that custody proceedings for
handicapped children are not the same as those employed for minor
children and that the court with jurisdiction is the court presiding over
conservator actions.
The Ohio Supreme Court, in Castle v. Castle, °4 held that the trial court
retains continuing jurisdiction over a minor child beyond the age of
majority when the child is disabled." 5 In another Ohio case, Abbas v.
Abbas, 6 the domestic relations court entered a divorce decree for the
parents and awarded custody of the couple's fully disabled adult child to
his mother. 7 The court concluded it was without authority to grant child
support for the son, who was already twenty-five years old.'0 8 The mother
argued that her son had not reached the age of majority because he was
never emancipated.'09 To substantiate her claim, the mother referred to the
statutory definition of the age of majority, which includes "[a]ll persons of
the age of eighteen years or more, who are under no legal disability."' 10
Therefore, she argued, the jurisdiction the court exercised over the custody
decree continued over further orders involving the disabled adult child."'
The mother also argued that because Castle held that parents have the duty
to support their handicapped child beyond the age of majority," 2 child
support was necessary, and jurisdiction was present." 3 The Court of
Appeals of Ohio agreed with the mother and determined that continuing
jurisdiction existed over these child support proceedings. The court
102 Id. at *3 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1-121 (2000) (current version at
TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1-121 (2002)).
103 Id. (citing State Dep't of Human Servs. v. Northern, 563 S.W.2d 197 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1978)).
'0' Castle v. Castle, 473 N.E.2d 803 (Ohio 1984).
'5 Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.01 (West 2002), which provides
that: "All persons of the age of eighteen years or more, who are under no legal
disability, are capable of contracting and are of full age for all purposes."); see also
supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
'0 Abbas v. Abbas, 715 N.E.2d 613 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
'o
7 Id. at 614.
108 Id.
109/Id.
"0 Id. at 615 (citing OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.01 (West 2002)).
.. Id. See also supra notes 76, 78 and accompanying text.
12 Castle v. Castle, 473 N.E.2d 803 (Ohio 1984).
13 Abbas, 715 N.E.2d at 613.
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commented that "[b]y granting 'custody' of James, age twenty-five at the
time, to the appellant, the court was essentially asserting that James had not
reached the 'age of majority.""" Here, the court that originally provided
the custody arrangement would retain jurisdiction to modify that arrange-
ment. The continued treatment of the disabled adult child as a minor
affected this decision. Granting jurisdiction to the court that originally ruled
in the case makes sense because that court has original jurisdiction and has
already become acquainted with-the family and the situation. These aspects
increase the effectiveness of the presiding court.
Alabama addresses modification of custody decrees involving disabled
adult children with the following statutory language:
Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, venue of all proceedings for
petitions or other actions seeking modification, interpretation, or
enforcement of a final decree awarding custody of a child or children to
a parent and/or granting visitation rights, and/or awarding child support,
and/or awarding other expenses incident to the support of a minor child
or children, and/or granting post-minority benefits for a child or children
is changed so that venue will lie in: (1) the original circuit court rendering
the final decree; or (2) in the circuit court of the county where both the
current custodial parent or, in the case of post-minority benefits, where
the most recent custodial parent, that parent having custody at the time of
the child's attaining majority, and the said child or children have resided
for a period of at least three consecutive years immediately preceding the
filing of the petition or other action. The current or most recent custodial
parent shall be able to choose the particular venue as herein provided,
regardless of which party files the petition or other action."
1 5
Alabama law recognizes two groups of individuals that may qualify for
post-minority support." 6 One group consists of children who want support
114 Id. at 615. The dissenting judges in Abbas offered an alternative for
evaluating such situations and emphasized the importance ofjurisdiction for these
decisions. The dissenters argued that before determining if a court retains
jurisdiction, the scope of the court's jurisdiction must first be established. Id. at 616
(Vukovich, J., dissenting). In Ohio, a domestic relations court is without
jurisdiction over a child who is already eighteen, and, therefore, could not have
jurisdiction over a twenty-five year old child despite his disabilities and possible
need for custody modification. Id.
'15 ALA. CODE § 30-3-5 (2002).
116 ALA. CODE § 30-3A-101 cmt. (2002).
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for post-secondary education." 7 The second group includes disabled adult
children."' In Ex Parte Brewington,119 the Alabama Supreme Court
expanded the definition of "children" in the child support statute to include
disabled adult children. 20 The use of "and/or" in this statute can be
construed to provide for the modification of custody decrees for "post-
minority" children.121 Though not stated expressly, the same court will have
jurisdiction over post-minority benefits and/or modification of custody
because these actions grant support for a post-minority child. This approach
gives jurisdiction to the original court issuing the decree or to the circuit
court.1
22
In Nebraska's present statutes, jurisdiction over child custody and child
support is limited to minor children.22 This problem manifests itself in
Kentucky statutes as well. K.R.S. § 403.110124 states the legislative purpose
of "[making] reasonable provision for spouse and minor children during
and after litigation."'125 It may be difficult, therefore, to fit adult disabled
children in this statutory scheme. Even if there is a way to construe the
statute to include adult handicapped children, the language is ambiguous
and will only lead to inconsistent and unpredictable results. Other
consequences involve avoidance of the issue and the exercise of improper
jurisdiction. Under the present statutes K.R.S. §§ 403.270 and 403.340,26
the circuit court has jurisdiction over child custody matters, but the
application of the statutes apparently ends when a child reaches the age of
eighteen.
To continue to act in a manner that is in the best interests of the child,
it is vital that Kentucky courts be able to alter custody arrangements for an
adult child who is disabled. Kentucky must provide a procedure by which
the court system can determine these issues even after the child is
technically an adult. This procedure can only effectively be provided
through legislation. Upon reaching the age of majority, a disabled child's
117Id.
118Id.
"9 Ex Parte Brewington, 445 So. 2d 294 (Ala. 1983).20 Id. at 296-97.
121 ALA. CODE § 30-3-5 (2002).
122 d. In this author's opinion, Kentucky should use a more direct approach
than that of Alabama.
123 See Kimbrough v. Kimbrough, 422 N.W.2d 556 (Neb. 1988). NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 42-351 (Michie 2002).
124 K.R.S. § 403.110 (Michie 2002).
125 Id. § 403.110(4).
126Id. §§ 403.270, 403.340.
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needs do not go away and may take on new forms. Consequently, the initial
custody decision may not always advance the child's "best interests,"
which means that a change is in order. For instance, an adult child who was
institutionalized or placed in a home as a minor may no longer be best
suited in that place due to changes in health or other circumstances.
The need to present these kinds of changing concerns for an adult
handicapped child to a court is evident. Possible responses by Kentucky to
provide for this gap in the law include guardianship law and family courts.
Depending on the option chosen, a different court will be required to hear
this concern. Each option presents a unique approach to child custody
modification for mentally handicapped adults.
11. THE TWIST OF GUARDIANSHIP AND FAMILY COURT
K.R.S. § 387.510 defines a "guardian" as "any individual, agency, or
corporation appointed by the court to have full care, custody, and control
of a disabled person and to manage his financial resources." '127 The
legislature has made it clear that guardians are neither necessary nor
preferred by declaring that a court should appoint a guardian "only as
necessary to promote the[ ] well-being, including protection from neglect,
exploitation, and abuse" of a disabled person.12 The four factors that
Kentucky courts consider when evaluating whether a particular person is
qualified to be a guardian are: "(1) [k]inship to respondent; (2) [e]ducation
and business experience of applicant; (3) [c]apability to handle financial
affairs; and (4) [a]bility to carry out the requirements set forth in K.R.S.
387.660 to 387.710 and 387.750. '129 A guardian maypetition for reappoint-
ment pursuant to K.R.S. § 387.610.130 The powers and obligations of a
guardian are described in K.R.S. § 387.660.131 The court may make a
127 Id. § 387.510(3) (discussed in Kentucky 2002 Session Law Regular Session,
Ch. 162 (H.B. No. 455)).12 Id. § 387.500(3). A "disabled" person is defmed in K.R.S. section 387.510
as one with "a legal, not a medical disability, and is measured by functional
inabilities." Id. § 387.510(8). This definition applies to anyone fourteen years of
age or older who cannot make informed decisions regarding certain personal affairs
or financial resources. Id.129 Id. § 387.605.
131Id. § 387.610. The reappointment can be for a term of five years or less, and
the petitioning guardian needs the required documents listed in this statute. Id.
131 Id. § 387.660. Specific powers include determining housing, providing for
the care, comfort, and maintenance of the ward, organizing suitable services, giving
consent for medical care or other services, acting to minimize rights and personal
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variety of changes to the guardianship order upon request by the disabled
or partially disabled person, his guardian, or another interested person
according to K.R.S. § 387.620.132 A conservator may also be appointed to
manage the financial resources of a disabled person.
133
District courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all guardianship and
conservator matters, including the determination of disability, appointment
and removal of guardians, modification of orders, and management and
settlement of accounts.'34 This authority of district courts conflicts with the
jurisdiction of circuit courts to modify custody decrees.1 35 In the situations
contemplated by this Note, the adult children would likely be eligible for
guardians due to their inabilities and vulnerability to abuse and neglect. 1
36
Further, the adult children would likely be unable to make their own
decisions in personal and financial matters.1 37 The guardianship law was
designed to take care of disabled individuals,' 38 and thus in most situations
an established guardianship will necessarily continue when the disabled
child reaches the age of majority because reaching the age of eighteen does
not cure the child's disability. While the guardian carries out his role to
care and provide for the disabled person, issues may arise that require
custody modification. Issues that the guardian may face involve medical
decisions and treatment. 39 The key to the jurisdictional grant of district
courts in K.R.S. § 387.520, as applicable to these adult disabled children,
is the language "modification of orders."'40 Modification of child custody
decrees, therefore, would seemingly rest with the district courts due to this
express language and the inability to classify the adult children as minors.
The fact that most disabled individuals will require a guardian exhibits the
advantage of utilizing guardian law. The guardian has a duty to the court
to provide for the disabled "child," meaning that the guardian must have a
venue in which he can express the child's best interests regarding a change
freedom restrictions, and carrying out these duties by reasonably utilizing financial
resources of the ward. Id.
132 Id. § 387.620(1). The court is able to terminate or modify an order, remove
or replace a guardian, or renew the present guardian's appointment. Id.
'I Id. § 387.510(1). See also id. §§ 387.680,387.700 (listing duties and powers
of conservators).
134 1d. § 387.520(1).
135 Youngblood v. Youngblood, 252 S.W.2d 21, 22-23 (Ky. 1952).
136 See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
131 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
138 Interview with Louise Graham, supra note 47.
139 K.R.S. § 387.660 (Michie 2002).
140 Id. § 387.520.
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in custody or with respect to other issues that will likely emerge in the adult
child's life.
The Kentucky family court system presents an additional option for
solving the jurisdictional question as applied to this issue. Family court
commenced in 1991 as "pilot projects" across the state.'4 The original
family court was located in Jefferson County.'42 This first court was
followed by nine additional family court projects made effective by House
Bill 544. 41 Presently, nineteen counties maintain these courts. 144 On
November 5, 2002, Kentucky voted yes on the ballot to amend the
Kentucky Constitution and provide for family courts. 45 The theme behind
the establishment of family courts in Kentucky is "One Family, One Judge,
One Court," meaning that one judge presides over any and all family-
related affairs-in one place. '46 The mission statement expresses the goals of
the family court as follows:,
The Department of Family Court provides service and support to the
Court of Justice and, further, extends service and support to families who
appear in our courts across the Commonwealth. It is our mission to assist
the greater court system in providing an accessible, impartial and
expeditious system ofjustice for Kentucky families and children. We are
committed to showing respect and sincerity for every person regardless of
their status, and we continuously strive to improve the quality and
141 Id. § 23A.100.
142 See Kentucky Court of Justice, Family Court, at http://www.kycourts.net/
AOC/FamilyCourt/AOC._FamilyCourt.shtm (last visited Jan. 31, 2003).
'
43 Id. (stating that Governor Paul Patton signed House Bill 544 in 1998).
'"See Joseph E. Lambert, Family Court: Where Children and Families Come
First, KENTUCKY LIVING, Mar. 2002, at http://www.kentuckyliving.com/article.
asp?articleid=55 l&issueid=95 (last visited Jan. 31, 2003). The pilot projects are
located in Jefferson, Gallatin, Boone, Franklin, McCracken, Christian, Warren,
Clark, Madison, Pulaski, Lincoln, Rockcastle, Magoffin, Knot, Floyd, Pike,
Oldhan, Henry, and Trimble. Id.
141 See Mark R. Chellgren, Family-Court Landslide Taken as Mandate,
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Nov. 6, 2002, available at http://www.kentucky.
com/mld/kentucky/news/politics/4454278.htm (last visited Jan. 11,2003). County-
by-county voting results are located atKentuckyFamily CourtAmendment I Voting
Results of November 5, 2002, at http://www.aoc.state.ky.us/jefferson/fnamend.
htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2003).
146 Family Court, supra note 142. See also The Family Court Constitutional
Amendment, available at http:www.aoc.state.ky.us/jefferson/fcamend.htm (last
visited Jan. 10, 2003).
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effectiveness of our services, while measuring success through the eyes
of the families who are touched by our Court.1
47
The effects of these courts include reduced stress caused by court-
hopping and greater family stability. In addition, the family courts offer
connections to other services and a trained staff to handle family matters.141
K.R.S. section 23A. 110 grants jurisdiction over child custody cases to the
family courts. 149 Family court jurisdiction also reaches cases involving
dissolution of marriage, visitation, spousal support, equitable distribution,
adoption, termination of parental rights, domestic violence (including
emergency orders), status offenses, paternity, dependency, neglect, and
abuse. 50 Family court extends to a broad spectrum of family law issues.
The major impetus behind the creation of family courts is proclaimed
to be better service to the children.' Chief Justice Joseph E. Lambert, a
proponent of family court, advanced public support for the courts by
stating:
Family law cases are the only priority of Family Courts. When parents are
in the middle of a bitter dispute, children suffer. If the process is drawn
out or if the case is heard over and over again by different commissioners
or judges, solutions may be delayed, inconsistent, or contradictory. While
it's impossible to completely protect children from th6 difficulties of life
such as divorce and family discord, Family Courts can help nurture
children and families through these difficult times.... While all cases are
important, none is more important than those involving children and
families.'" 2
This method of thinking coincides with the standard applied during child
custody proceedings.' Acquiring knowledge regarding the unique
situation of each child through greater individualized attention advances the
best interests of the child. Due to the specialized interest of the family
17 Family Court, supra note 142.
48 Chief Justice Joseph E. Lambert, The Kentucky Family Court Amendment,
athttp://www.kybar.org/PDF files/KLU 2001_materials/FamCtAr.pdf, at 13 (last
visited Jan. 10, 2003). See also Family Court, supra note 142.
141 K.R.S. § 23A. 110(3)(b) (Michie 2002).
I5°1d. § 23A.110(e).
's' Lambert, supra note 144.
152 Id.
153 Seesupra notes 65-68 and accompanying text (discussing the "best interests"
of the child standard).
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court, this venue could be the best match for the custody issues of
handicapped adult children. The trained family court staffwould greatly aid
in the discovery of the handicapped child's needs and could help determine
the best methods by which those needs can be met.
Circuit courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the family courts,
which complements the jurisdiction of circuit courts in child custody
matters, as discussed above. 154 Again, however, jurisdiction over guardian-
ship belongs to the district court.'55 It seems logical that the Kentucky
Legislature should provide jurisdiction to the family court to hear cases on
this issue. Issues such as guardianship and custody changes involving
disabled adult children are an obvious fit with the special attention offered
by the family courts, though adult disabled children have not been
specifically named as intended beneficiaries of this court's services. As the
law and jurisdiction develop in this new area of special Kentucky courts,
wide openings ensue for the legislature to take steps to insert provisions for
custody modification of handicapped adult children, who have heretofore
been denied a comprehensive forum in which to have their needs discussed
and settled.
For those children who have been handicapped prior to reaching the
age of majority, family court may be the best venue in which to address
their needs. Those children who become handicapped after reaching the age
of eighteen could be best served by guardianship law. Uniformity is
preferred, however, so the legislature should determine which procedure
could best assist both groups together. The special training available to
family courts, if enabling individuals to address the needs of handicapped
children before and after the age of eighteen, would provide an advantage
to placing jurisdiction with these courts.
IV. KENTUCKY SHOULD MAKE A STATUTORY MOVE
The Kentucky Legislature has not spoken on the jurisdiction of courts
over the modification of custody for disabled children once they have
reached the age of majority. As the practical circumstances of life reveal,
courts will encounter this question, and a uniform answer is needed.
Presently, judges in various courts may be making these decisions without
proper jurisdiction and without the ability to determine the best interests of
the child. Two options for Kentucky appear to be: (1) construe the present
114 K.R.S. § 23A.010(5) (Michie 2002). See also supra notes 87-91 and
accompanying text.
' See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 91
CHILD CUSTODY FOR DISABLED ADULTS
statutes to confer jurisdiction over custody modification of adult handi-
capped children to a certain court; or (2) compel the legislature to act.
Either option would require clarification of intent by the legislature.
Other states that have applied statutes to this situation present
approaches tojurisdictional provision. The Scott'56 court placed a great deal
of emphasis on legislative intent.'57 Under the statutes applied in that case,
the court determined that jurisdiction was given to the court governing
conservators.'58 This situation parallels the district court jurisdiction of
guardianship in Kentucky.'59 The Ohio court inAbbas'" granted jurisdic-
tion to the court with original jurisdiction over custody proceedings.' 6 For
children under the age of eighteen in Kentucky, this approach would
probably result in circuit court jurisdiction. 62 The Abbas court pointed to
the statutory requirement that jurisdiction over child custody modification
belongs to the court that exercised jurisdiction over the child in the first
place. 3 In Kentucky, however, the circuit court's jurisdiction to modify
child custody arrangements terminates when the child reaches eighteen per
K.R.S. § 403.270.1'
The Kentucky Legislature must first take a hard look at the present
state statutes. Deciding whether this issue should be resolved under child
custody statutes or guardianship statutes constitutes a beginning step. The
guardian is the person determined by the court to best represent and protect
the needs and well-being of the adult disabled child. 65 If the district court
has taken a serious look at the child's situation as required by the guardian
statutes, then the guardian has been designated as the filter for changes in
the adult disabled child's life. If the district court is also given statutory
jurisdiction to modify custody of an adult disabled child, then the jurisdic-
tion over the guardian and the adult disabled child will rest with the same
court, therefore controlling both individuals and promoting a unified effort
156 Scott v. Scott, No. 03A01-9708-CH-00305, 1999 WL 39506 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Jan. 29, 1999).
'
57 See supra notes 92-103 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
119 K.R.S. § 387.520 (Michie 2002).
160 Abbas v. Abbas, 715 N.E.2d 613 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
161 See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
62 K.R.S. §§ 403.270,403.340 (Michie 2002).
163 Supra notes 111-13. The Alabama statutes examined, ALA. CODE § 30-3-5
(2002), also provides jurisdiction to the original court possessing jurisdiction or the
circuit court. See supra note 115.
'64 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
165 See supra notes 127-33, 138 and accompanying text.
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for the adult disabled child.166 The advantages of circuit court jurisdiction,
however, include the time and previous exposure to the child and his
situation. The circuit court knows why it gave custody to the particular
parent at the time of divorce and has greater experience in custody matters.
Undeniably, however, this jurisdiction could not apply to the adult child
who becomes handicapped after reaching the age of eighteen because the
circuit court would never have had jurisdiction over the child originally.'67
The same problem applies to parents who divorce after the child has
already reached eighteen. 6 ' On the other hand, the district court has
familiarity with the child when it appoints a guardian, and this court would
have jurisdiction over an adult child who later becomes disabled because
it determines when a guardian is needed, despite the age of disability. 69
Family court jurisdiction has only recently become a possible
consideration for assisting disabled adults. Implementation of family courts
across the entire state, beyond the pilot projects, may prove helpful in
addressing this need. As was stated by former Kentucky Supreme Court
Chief Justice Lambert, "[c]hildren and families are Kentucky's most
important resource. When they have legal problems and must come to
court, they deserve our highest priority." ' Perhaps the passage of the
family court amendment will raise concern in the legislature for custody
changes in post-majority proceedings. With the jurisdiction over child
custody and the goal of primarily serving the children through its expertise,
the family court is a likely prospect for solving this problem.' This issue
is one of family law, and the family court was created for this purpose. The
reach of the family court to adults, however, is uncertain. 72 The legislature
can make this decision presently and grant additional jurisdiction to the
family court. Further, the legislature should address the definition of the
age of majority and its application to statutes. Modification of custody
decrees for adult disabled children suits the family court in a general sense
and may be best served by the intricate and effective methods and
'66 See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
167 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
168 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
169 See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
'70Lambert, supra note 144.
..' See supra notes 141-55 and accompanying text.
"7 Based on the author's research, the applicability of the family court juris-
diction to adult children beyond the age of majority in any capacity may not have
been decided yet. With the recent approval of the Family Court Amendment in
November of 2002, these courts have not been completely implemented. Therefore,
the jurisdiction issue could still be a consideration.
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knowledge of the court and its staff, particularly considering the child's
special needs. Guardianship would be a likely addition to family court
jurisdiction because "dependency, neglect, and abuse," which are within
the sphere of guardian protection, are already included.173
In some states, including Kentucky, the court considers the wishes of
the minor when making some of these important decisions.74 If the child
is at least fourteen, he can provide the district court with a nomination for
guardian or conservator.'75 A question to consider is whether the same
opportunity can be given to a disabled adult child. Certainly the particular
situation and abilities of the child will influence the answer to this inquiry.
The adult child is likely to have preferences, however, and, to the extent he
can communicate these preferences, it seems most appropriate to consider
these wishes. The inclusion of this aspect would be an additional benefit to
the clear establishment of jurisdiction and consideration of this type of
case.
CONCLUSION
As Kentucky pledges to place more emphasis on families and children,
a necessary component of such emphasis is provision for custody place-
ment and modification for mentally handicapped children over the age of
eighteen. Over time, the modification in child support cases for mentally
handicapped children beyond majority has received consideration.'76
However, the potentially numerous custody issues loom large. As parents
are usually required to support their mentally handicapped children even
beyond the typical time of emancipation,'77 they must further care for the
placement of the child beyond this age. The solution to this issue remains
with the Kentucky courts and legislature. Considering the actions of
other states in this area, Kentucky must also take steps to address the prob-
lem.
178
I" K.R.S. § 23A. 110(3) (Michie 2002).
174 Id. § 387.050.
175 id.
176 See supra notes 30, 33-45 and accompanying text.
177 See Breuer v. Dowden, 268 S.W. 541,542 (Ky. 1925); Freeburger v. Bichell,
763 A.2d 1226, 1229 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000); see also Dransfield, supra note
8.
178 Tennessee has utilized conservator proceedings to address this issue. See
supra notes 92-103 and accompanying text. Ohio has allowed the court with prior
jurisdiction to retain that jurisdiction over later proceedings. See supra notes 106-
14 and accompanying text.
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Ultimately, the preferable solution is for legislative action to determine
the jurisdiction for custody proceedings involving mentally handicapped
adults. A court needs to retain or possess jurisdiction to respond to the
changing circumstances in the lives of these adults. The implementation of
family courts in Kentucky provides an opportunity for such action.'79 Until
such action occurs, jurisdiction may be granted to either the district court
or the circuit court under the child custody statute or the guardianship
statute.' Uniformity ofjurisdiction will not exist under these approaches,
however. Therefore, the optimal decision is vesting jurisdiction in one
court. At this time, it seems most appropriate to vest jurisdiction in the
family court that is designed to deal with family matters in one place.'' An
important aspect of placing jurisdiction with the family court is providing
the family court with people who are specially trained to manage the needs
of handicapped individuals and their families. This benefit could require
further attention by the legislature and the family court in supplying such
people to fill this role, but the training is important to meet everyday
changes. An unresolved issue requires attention. Attention by the legisla-
ture to this necessity of handicapped adults can produce a resolution.
Ending the uncertainty must begin now--the best interests of Kentucky's
children and families demand it.
'79 See supra notes 141-54 and accompanying text.
'go See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
181 See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
